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Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties: Judicial 




Beneficial owner is one of the most important concepts used in tax treaties. It
limits the benefit of treaty-reduced withholding taxes on dividends, interest
and royalties to recipients who are beneficial owners of such income. The
term has been adopted in most bilateral tax treaties, but defined in none. Its
meaning is thus left to be interpreted under Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (the Model). Because the term
has no specific meaning in the domestic tax law of most countries, the way
in which domestic courts should interpret this treaty-originated concept has
been the subject of much scholarly debate.
2
There had been very little case law on the interpretation of the term
beneficial owner until the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in Indofood.3 This
1. Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Canada. The author
thanks Leo Xu and Simon Leith for their excellent research assistance, Rick Krever and
Scott Wilkie for their comments on the earlier draft of this paper.
2. Avi-Yonah, R. and C. HJI Panayi, “Rethinking Treaty-Shopping Lessons for the
European Union” (January 2010), available at www.law.umich.edu/centresand pro-
grams/elsc/abstracts/pages/papers.aspx; Baker, P., “The United Nations Model Double
Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries: Possible Exten-
sion of the Beneficial Ownership Concept” – Annex to “Progress Report of Subcommit-
tee on Improper Use of Tax Treaties: Beneficial Ownership”, e/c.18/2–8/CRP.2/Add.1,
17 October 2008; De Broe, L. International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse: A 
Study under Domestic Tax Law, Tax Treaties and EC Law In Relation to Conduit and 
Base Companies (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007); Elliffe, C., “The Interpretation and mean-
ing of ‘beneficial owner’ in New Zealand” [2009] BTR, p. 276; Ward, D. A., “Access
to Tax Treaty Benefits”, Research Report Prepared for the Advisory Panel on Canada’s
System of International Taxation September 2008, available at www.apcsit-gcrcfi.ca;
Fraser, R. and Oliver, J.D.B. “Beneficial Owner: HMRC’s Draft Guidance on Interpre-
tation of the Indofood Decision”, [2007] BTR, pp. 39-57; Oliver, J.D.B., Libin, J.B.,
Van Weeghel, S. and Toit, C. “Beneficial Ownership and the OECD Model”, [2007]
BTR, p. 27 at 37; Vogel, K., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (3rd ed), (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1977) at 561; Du Toit, C.P., Beneficial Ownership 
of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties, (Amsterdam: IBFD, 1999); Van Weeghel, S., The 
Improper Use of Tax Treaties (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998).
3. Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2006] EWCA
Civ. 158, STL 1195.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000816
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case has been accompanied by several others, including Bank of Scotland,4
Real Madrid 5 and Prévost.6 These cases have attracted a great deal of
attention in the international tax community. Upon reflection, though, one
wonders if they have actually advanced our understanding about such basic
questions as:
– To what extent is domestic law meaning relevant to the interpretation
of a unique treaty concept?
7
– Should there be an autonomous international meaning given to this term?
– Is factual or economic substance consideration relevant in the
determination of whether the formal owner is the beneficial owner of
income? If so, how?
– How relevant are later OECD Commentaries?
This paper demonstrates how courts have attempted to answer these questions,
and makes some general observations about where the courts have diverged
and converged on this matter. The main conclusion of this paper is that by
leaving the interpretation to domestic courts, “there seems little chance of there
being an accepted universal meaning” of the term beneficial ownership.
8
 Lastly,
the paper makes the case for clarity through the revision of the Commentary.
2.  Difficulties in interpreting beneficial owner
Pursuant to Art. 3(2) of the Model, undefined treaty terms are to be given the
meaning that they have under the relevant domestic law unless the context
of the treaty otherwise requires. This rule presumes that the undefined term
has a meaning under domestic law and that the context can be established.
In the case of beneficial ownership, however, neither presumption is
4. Conseil d’Etat, 29 December 2006, Ministre de L’Economi, des Finances et de 
L’Industrie v. Societe Bank of Scotland, no.283314. See 9 1 TLR 1.
5. Real Madrid F.C. v. Oficina Nacional de Inspeccion (18 July 2006), Westlaw
Aranzadi JUR\2006\204307. For commentary, see Adolfo Martin Jimenez, IBFD-Tax
Treaty Case Law Database: http://online2.ibfd.org/highligh/collections/ttcls.html.c1_
es_2006-07-18_1-summary.html
6. Prévost Car Inc. v. Canada, 2008 3080 (TCC), aff’d by FCA, 2009 DTC 5053.
7. De Broe, note 2, at 668. See also Vogel, note 2, at 562; Baker, note 2, Para. 29.
8. Avery Jones, J. et al., “The Treatment of Trusts under the OECD Model Conven-
tion” 29 European Taxation (1989), p. 379.
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realistic. Domestic judges must thus rely on the legal principles and tradi-
tions known to them, which may vary from one jurisdiction to another.
2.1.  Unique treaty concept
Beneficial owner is a unique treaty concept in the sense that it is used almost
exclusively in treaties based on the OECD Model, and has no clear mean-
ing under the domestic tax law of most countries. It originated in the United
Kingdom and was used to distinguish from legal ownership in circumstances
where the legal ownership was akin to a nominee or agent.
9
Since its adop-
tion into the Model in 1977, beneficial owner has been incorporated into the
UN Model Convention and the vast majority of bilateral tax treaties.
10
The meaning of beneficial owner is elusive under the domestic law of most
countries. Civil law countries do not use this concept, creating an issue
of compatibility of the transplanted treaty concept with domestic law.
11
Even in common law countries, the meaning is not clearly established. For
example, the Canadian Income Tax Act
12
uses this term without defining it.
2.2.  Divergent legal traditions
Courts in different legal traditions adopt different approaches to the inter-
pretation of tax statutes and tax treaties. For example, in civil law traditions,
the doctrine of abuse of rights is used to combat tax avoidance, including
treaty shopping.
13
Courts tend to interpret tax legislation purposively and
characterize facts in accordance with the substance of the transactions,
and are more willing to recognize the doctrine of treaty abuse.
14
9. Van Weeghel, note 2, at 65. Baker, note 2.
10. In Prévost, the Tax Court of Canada noted in Para. 60 that this term was used in
85 of Canada’s 86 tax treaties. Only Canada’s treaty with Australia uses the term “ben-
eficially entitled”.
11. De Broe, note 2, at 668.
12. RSC 1985 (5th supp.), c.1. For further discussion, see Brender, M., “Beneficial
Ownership in Canadian Income Tax Law,” Symposium: Beneficial Ownership and the 
Income Tax Act” 51 Canadian Tax Journal (2003) No. 1, at 424-427.
13. This doctrine may be expressed as a statutory rule or an inherent principle of
interpretation. See Prebble, Z. and Prebble, J. “Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance
Rule of Income Tax Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of Abuse of Law” 62 Bulletin for 
International Taxation (2008) p. 151; Ward, note 2, at 29-36; Ward, D.A. et al., “The
Business Purpose Test and Abuse of Rights” [1985] BTR, p. 68.
14. See Bank of Scotland, note 4. Indofood may be considered an example as well since
the UK Court referred to the domestic anti-abuse doctrine adopted by Indonesian court.
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In contrast, courts in common law jurisdictions (other than the United States) 
have not embraced the anti-abuse doctrine.
15
 The legislatures in Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand enacted a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) 
to instruct the courts to interpret taxing statutes in accordance with the object 
and purpose of the legislation.
16
 Even after the introduction of the GAAR, 
Canadian courts have consistently rejected the substance-over-form doctrine.
17
2.3.  Controversy over treaty shopping 
Under Art. 3(2), the domestic law meaning of an undefined treaty term 
applies if the context of the treaty does not otherwise require. Context is 
determined in particular by the intention of the contracting, and the mean-
ing in the legislation of the other contracting state (an implicit reference to 
the principle of reciprocity on which the Model is based).
18
 OECD Com-
mentaries are generally considered as part of the context. 
The notion of treaty shopping is believed to have originated in the United 
States to aptly describe a phenomenon where “a person ‘shops’ into an 
otherwise unavailable treaty through complicated structures”.
19
 Treaty 
shopping is a form of tax avoidance as opposed to tax evasion. It is contro-
versial whether treaties are intended to prevent tax avoidance. 
Other examples include A Holdings ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR (2005) 
536, in which the Swiss Federal Court said (in translation) that there is an anti-abuse 
doctrine in treaty law which prohibits the use of an institute of law against its purpose to 
realize interests which are not protected by it.
15. For a discussion of the GAAR in common law countries, see Arnold, B.J., “A 
comparison of statutory general anti-avoidance rules and judicial general anti-avoidance 
doctrines as a means of controlling tax avoidance: Which is better? (What would John 
Tiley think?)” in Comparative Perspectives on Revenue Law: Essays in Honour of John 
Tiley, edited by Avery Jones, J., Harris, P. and Oliver, J.D.B. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).
16. In Canada, for example, the GAAR was enacted in 1988 to overrule the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision in Stubart, which rejected the business purpose doctrine, and held 
that taxpayers’ rights to minimize taxation had been well entrenched in Canadian law. See 
Li, J., “Economic Substance”: “Drawing the Line Between Legitimate Tax Minimization 
and Abusive Tax Avoidance”, [2006] Vol. 54, no.1 Canadian Tax Journal p. 23.
17  The Supreme Court of Canada stated in Shell Canada Limited v. The Queen, 
99 DTC 5669, at Para. 39: “[T]his Court has never held that the economic realities of 
a situation can be used to recharacterize a taxpayer’s bona fide relationships. To the 
contrary, we have held that, absent a specific provision of the Act to the contrary or a 
finding that they are a sham, the taxpayer’s legal relationships must be respected in tax 
cases. Recharacterization is only permissible if the label attached by the taxpayer to a 
particular transaction does not properly reflect the actual legal effect.”
18. OECD Commentary on Art. 3, Para. 12.
19. Avi-Yonah and Panayi, note 2, at 2-4.
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In terms of tax policy, treaty shopping may be regarded as abusive tax avoid-
ance or the improper use of tax treaties, an instrument for advancing the 
intended purpose of a tax treaty, or a form of acceptable tax planning. The 
OECD considers treaty shopping problematic for three primary reasons: it 
breaches the principle of reciprocity;
20
 it results in double non-taxation or 
inadequate taxation;
21
 and it destroys the incentive for countries to negoti-
ate and conclude new treaties.
22
 The UN Treaty Shopping Report
23
 sug-
gests that there may be public benefits in allowing treaty shopping. Some 
countries that are keen on attracting investment may actively desire that 
dividends or interest paid to a recipient in a treaty country be subject to 
low or no withholding tax, even if the recipient is a holding company for 
shareholders based in third countries. Double non-taxation caused by treaty 
shopping is thus not a basis for objection in all cases. The report also notes 
that, if one of the general objectives of tax treaties is to promote “freer flows 
of international trade and investment, it may be generally arguable that it 
does not matter if the desirable result is achieved by the direct use of tax 
treaties or by their indirect use [i.e. treaty shopping] ”.
24
 Some developing 
countries may regard treaty shopping as a form of tax incentive to attract 
scarce foreign capital. For example, the Indian Supreme Court considered 
that treaty shopping was a necessary evil in a developing economy and is 
generally valid under the Indian tax treaty network.
25
Courts in different countries have adopted different levels of tolerance 
to treaty shopping. The French courts considered the treaty shopping 
arrangement in Bank of Scotland abusive, while Canadian courts stated 
that there is nothing inherently proper or improper with selecting one for-
eign regime over another and that (treaty) shopping – on its own cannot be 
viewed as being abusive.
26
20. OECD, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies, adopted 
by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986 (the OECD Conduit Report), at 90.
21. OECD Commentary, Art. 1 Paras. 8, 9 and 11.
22. OECD Conduit Report, note 20, at 90.
23. UN, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Contributions to 
International Co-operation in Tax Matters: Treaty Shopping, Thin Capitalization, Co-
operation between Tax Authorities, Resolving International Tax Disputes (UN: 
New York, 1988), at 7. 
24. Id.
25. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, [2003] 6 ITLR 233. For a review of this 
case, see Baistrocchi, E., “The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging 
World: Theory and Implications”, [2008] BTR, p. 352. China, on the other hand, holds 
a different view – treaty shopping is generally abusive. For further comments, see Yang, 
H., “New Developments in the General Anti-Abuse Rules and the Impact on Interna-
tional Tax Planning” Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin (May/June 2009) p. 176.
26. MIL (Investments) SA v. The Queen, 2006 DTC 3307 (TCC), Para. 69.
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2.4.  Ill-defined bargain between treaty partners
The concept of beneficial ownership is a tool to protect the bargain between 
the two contracting states. The fundamental underpinnings of a treaty are 
mutual concessions by treaty partners, each in its own interest. Neither 
country would intend to relinquish its tax base without getting something 
back for it. Beneficial owner is used to confine the bargain to the parties 
who were intended to benefit from it. If the benefits of the treaty are delib-
erately channelled to outsiders, it defeats the bargain. On the other hand, 
one treaty partner might say that it intends to set itself up as a conduit 
regime, and if the other partner doesn’t like it, it should do something about 
it. The difficulty is that this question requires a point of reference that, argu-
ably, does not exist in a legal sense. Hence, interpretation of the meaning of 
beneficial ownership becomes difficult. 
3.  Judicial interpretation 
3.1.  The leading cases
The four cases on beneficial ownership deal with the question of whether an 
interposed company located in a treaty-friendly jurisdiction (Netherlands 
in Indofood and Prévost, Hungary in Real Madrid, and United Kingdom 
in Bank of Scotland) is a beneficial owner for the purpose of the respective 
treaty. The income that is “channelled” through the interposed company is 
interest in Indofood, royalties in Real Madrid, dividends in Prévost, and 
dividends (recharacterized as interest) in Bank of Scotland. The judgments 
in Indofood and Prévost were written in a typical common law style – detailed, 
and relatively well reasoned. The Bank of Scotland and Real Madrid deci-
sions are much shorter, written by judges who “are trained to keep their 
thoughts to themselves” .
27
 The courts have adopted different approaches to 
the interpretation of beneficial ownership. 
3.1.1.  Indofood
Indofood is a leading case on beneficial ownership. For the first time, a UK 
court had to provide a definition of the term beneficial owner in a treaty.
27. Ward, note 2, at 173.
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The facts of the Indofood case are complex. An Indonesian company, Indo-
food, set up a Mauritian special purpose vehicle (Issuer) to issue loan notes. 
Back-to-back loan arrangements were put in place. The loan notes contained 
a gross-up clause and provided for early redemption in case that, due to tax 
or treaty changes, the Issuer had to pay additional tax in Indonesia. The notes 
also contained a clause requiring the Issuer to try to mitigate any additional 
tax liability by taking reasonable measures available to it before seeking to 
redeem the notes. The financing was structured via Mauritius in order to take 
advantage of the lower withholding tax rates under the Indonesia–Mauritius 
treaty. Mauritius has no outbound withholding taxes. In reaction to the prob-
lem of abuse of the treaty by conduit companies, Indonesia terminated its 
treaty with Mauritius effective 1 January 2005, thus increasing Indonesian 
withholding tax on the interest payments from a 10% treaty rate to 20% stan-
dard rate. Since the issue of the notes in 2002, both interest and exchange 
rates had moved against Indofood and in favour of the noteholders. Indofood 
sought to redeem the notes and refinance them at a cheaper rate. JP Morgan 
Chase, acting as trustee for the bondholders, was not satisfied that the best 
endeavours clause had been complied with. It alleged that Indofood could 
have interposed a Dutch Newco into their structure and availed of the pref-
erable rates under the Netherlands–Indonesia treaty. Therefore, JP Morgan 
refused to approve the redemption. The main substantive issue at trial was 
whether Newco would be the beneficial owner of the interest payable to it by 
Indofood for the purposes of the Indonesia–Netherlands treaty. The case was 
heard in the United Kingdom because the choice of law was English law. 
The UK High Court
28
 found that Newco would be the beneficial owner of 
the interest, noting:
It is clear that Newco, […] will not be a nominee or agent for any other party 
and, not being any sort of trustee or fiduciary, will have power to dispose of the 
interest when received as it wishes, although it will be constrained by its con-
tractual obligation to the Issuer to apply the proceeds of the interest payments 
in performance of those obligations.
29
The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s decision and held 
that Newco could not be the beneficial owner of the interest received 
from Indonesia for purposes of the Indonesia–Netherlands treaty. The 
Court adopted an international fiscal meaning by relying on the OECD 
Commentary and the published views of Philip Baker. For example, 
the Court quoted with approval the following from the Commentary:
28. Indofood, note 3.
29. Id., Para. 46.
194
Bene!cial Ownership in Tax Treaties: Judicial Interpretation  
and the Case for Clarity
Where an item of income is received by a resident of a Contracting State acting 
in the capacity of agent or nominee it would be inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the Convention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption 
merely on account of the status of the immediate recipient of the income as a 
resident of the other Contracting State. The immediate recipient of the income 
in this situation qualifies as a resident but no potential double taxation arises 
as a consequence of that status since the recipient is not treated as the owner 
of the income for tax purposes in the State of residence. It would be equally 
inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention for the State of 
source to grant relief or exemption where a resident of a Contracting State, 
… simply acts as a conduit for another person who in fact receives the benefit 
of the income concerned. For these reasons, the [Conduit Companies Report] 
concludes that a conduit company cannot normally be regarded as the benefi-
cial owner if, though the formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very narrow 
powers which render it, in relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary 
or administrator acting on account of the interested parties.
30
The Court concluded that “the concept of beneficial ownership is incom-
patible with that of the formal owner who does not have the full privilege 
to directly benefit from the income”.
31
 The phrase “full privilege to directly 
benefit from income” is not from the Commentary or Philip Baker’s writ-
ings, but a circular letter issued by the Indonesian tax authorities.
3.1.2.  Bank of Scotland 
The French Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d’Etat) denied ben-
efits under the France–UK treaty to Bank of Scotland, a resident of the 
United Kingdom, on the receipt of dividends paid by a French company. 
Bank of Scotland had acquired from a US corporation a usufruct for three 
years over non-voting shares that were specifically issued in respect of this 
arrangement. The bank paid FRS 270 million for the usufruct but they were 
in turn entitled to dividends which amounted to an amount slightly more 
than FRS 270 million. The US corporation agreed to indemnify the bank 
if the French subsidiary was unable to pay the dividends and or where the 
French Treasury would not pay the dividend tax credit. The US corporation 
agreed to give all financial support to the French subsidiary to enable it to 
pay the dividends and the bank could step out of the transaction where the 
subsidiary did not meet certain profit thresholds. 
30. Id., Para. 32. The Court noted that Philip Baker suggests that the term should be 
accorded an international fiscal meaning not derived from the domestic laws of contract-
ing states.
31. Indofood, note 3, Para. 46.
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This arrangement was designed to benefit from the dividend tax credit 
under Art. 9(7) of the France–UK treaty that has no counterpart in the 
France–US treaty. If the bank were successful in receiving the repayment 
of the dividend tax credit, it would receive Frs 74.25 million more than its 
initial investment of Frs 270 million.
The Conseil d’Etat reversed the decision of the lower court, which found 
that the Bank was not an artificial conduit interposed between the US cor-
poration and the French subsidiary, nor that it acted as a nominee or an 
agent of the US corporation in collecting the dividends. The Conseil d’Etat 
recharacterized the transaction between the bank and the US corporation 
as a disguised loan and held that the US corporation continued to be the 
beneficial owner of the dividends. 
3.1.3.  Real Madrid 
The taxpayer was a Spanish football club. It made payments to a Hungar-
ian company for the right to use image rights for one of its players. The 
Hungarian company immediately transferred 99% of the amounts received 
to a Netherlands company. The Spanish tax authorities denied the zero 
withholding tax on royalties provided by the Hungary–Spain treaty on the 
ground that the Hungarian company was interposed for the sole purpose of 
benefiting from this treaty, and thus, not a beneficial owner. 
The Court upheld the tax authorities’ decision. In the court’s view, this is a 
case where the context otherwise requires. Therefore, reference to domes-
tic law is excluded and the autonomous international meaning should be 
applied. The Court relied on OECD materials in concluding that “the clear 
objective of the concept of beneficial owner is its function as a device 
against any form of treaty shopping” and “an economic interpretation can 
be applied to find the ‘real owner’ of the income whereby the legal owner-
ship of income could be disregarded”.
32
3.1.4.  Prévost 
Prévost is the first Canadian case on the interpretation of beneficial owner in 
tax treaties. The facts of the case are straightforward. Prévost is a company 
located in the province of Quebec (a civil law jurisdiction) and is a resident 
32. Real Madrid, note 5, Para. 2.
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of Canada. In 1995, Volvo, a company resident in Sweden, acquired all the 
shares of Prévost, and shortly after the acquisition transferred the shares 
to a Dutch holding company (Holdco). Later, Henlys, a UK company, 
acquired 49% of the shares of Holdco. Pursuant to a shareholders’ agree-
ment, Volvo and Henlys agreed that Prévost and the Holdco distribute at 
least 80% of their profits to the shareholders. Prévost paid dividends to 
Holdco according to the predetermined dividend policy and withheld and 
remitted tax at the rate of 5% under the Canada–Netherlands treaty. Holdco 
then distributed the dividends received from Prévost to Volvo and Henlys. 
The Canada Revenue Agency assessed the Canadian withholding tax on the 
basis that Holdco was not the beneficial owner of the dividends.
Rip, J. of the Tax Court of Canada held that Holdco was the beneficial 
owner of the dividends.
33
 He rejected the Crown’s position that beneficial 
ownership should have an internationally recognized interpretation instead 
of a domestic solution. Rip, J. stated:
I am being asked to determine what the words ‘beneficial owner’ and ‘bénéfici-
aire effectif’ (and the Dutch equivalent) mean in Article 10(2) of the Tax Treaty. 
Article 3(2) of the Tax Treaty requires me to look to a domestic solution in 
interpreting ‘beneficial owner’. The OECD Commentaries on the 1977 Model 
Convention with respect to Article 10(2) are also relevant.
34
Because beneficial owner is undefined in the Canadian Income Tax Act, 
Rip, J. held that the ordinary meaning in private law governs. After con-
sidering the meaning of this term under Canadian common law, income 
tax law, the Civil Code of Quebec,
35
 and Dutch law,
36
 he concluded that “in 
both common law and the civil law, the persons who ultimately receive the 
income are the owners of the income property.”
37
In my view the ‘beneficial owner’ of dividends is the person who receives 
the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment and assumes the risk and 
control of the dividend he or she received. The person who is beneficial owner 
of the dividend is the person who enjoys and assumes all the attributes of 
ownership.
38
33. The withholding tax rate for dividends is 10% under the Canada–UK treaty and 
15% under the Canada–Sweden treaty, but 5% under the Canada–Netherlands treaty.
34. Prévost (TCC), note 6, Para. 95.
35. Id., Paras. 97 and 98.
36. The court relied on experts from the Netherlands on the meaning of Dutch law. 
These experts include Van Weeghel, Rogier Raas, and Daniel Lüthi.
37. Prévost (TCC), note 6, Para. 99.
38. Id., Para. 100.
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Rip, J. cited the OECD materials as part of general background information 
without relying on them in his analysis. He did indicate – in an apparent 
implicit reference to the Conduit Report and the 2003 Commentary – that a 
conduit company is not a beneficial owner, but conspicuously said nothing 
more about the notion of conduit company.
39
Rip, J. concluded that Holdco was the beneficial owner of dividends on the 
basis of the legal relationships and Dutch corporate law.
40
 The relationship 
between Holdco and its shareholders is not one of agency, nor one where 
the property is in the name of a nominee. Holdco was the registered owner 
of Prévost shares, paid for the shares and owned the shares for itself. When 
dividends are received by Holdco, the dividends are the property of Holdco 
and are available to its creditors, if any, until such time as the management 
board declares a dividend. 
Rip, J. found that Holdco was not a conduit because: (a) it is not a party to 
the shareholder agreement that required a distribution of a minimal 80% of 
after-tax profits; (b) it cannot be said to have “absolutely no discretion as to 
the use or application of funds put through it as a conduit”; and (c) it has not 
“agreed to act on someone else’s behalf pursuant to that person’s instruc-
tions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it, for 
example a stockbroker who is the registered owner of the shares it holds for 
clients”. There was no predetermined or automatic flow of funds to them. 
As a corporate entity, Holdco carried on business operations in accordance 
with the Dutch law under which it was constituted. Its corporate veil cannot 
be pierced. Holdco’s deed of incorporation did not obligate it to pay any 
dividend to its shareholders; when it decides to pay dividends, it must pay 
the dividends in accordance with the Dutch law. 
There are some facts in this case that were not considered relevant by the 
court. In one instance, over $5 million was transferred by Prévost to Henlys 
without properly signed resolution of the managing directors of Holdco. 
In documentation provided to its banker, Holdco had declared that the 
shares of Prévost were beneficially owned by Volvo and Henlys. One of 
Prévost’s corporate minute book confused Volvo and Henlys with its actual 
sole shareholder, Holdco. The court noted that “this is at least sloppy main-
tenance of corporate records but could also be an indication of something 
more significant”, but did not draw any inference from it. 
39. Id., Para. 96.
40. Id., Paras. 100-105.
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The Federal Court of Appeal upheld Justice Rip’s decision. It also found 
that Justice Rip’s definition of beneficial owner accords with what is stated 
in the OECD Commentaries and in the Conduit Report. In fact, at least half 
of the Court’s judgment deals with the potential role of later Commentaries 
in interpreting a pre-existing treaty. More notably, the Court remarked that 
“later commentaries can guide the treaty interpretation when they repre-
sent a fair interpretation of the words of the Model Convention and do not 
conflict with Commentaries in existence at the time a specific treaty was 
entered and when, of course, neither treaty partner has registered an objec-
tion to the new Commentaries”.
41
3.2.  Basic interpretive questions
3.2.1.  Domestic law meaning or international meaning?
The question of whether beneficial owner should have a domestic law 
meaning or international meaning has been controversial. Some commen-
tators
42
 argue that the term should be given an autonomous international 
meaning rather than a domestic law meaning, on the grounds that: (a) it was 
introduced into international tax lexicon through the work of the OECD, 
then the UN Model; (b) while the term is widely incorporated into tax trea-
ties, only some countries employ this term in their domestic law; and (c) the 
purpose of using this concept is to prevent treaty shopping, which is better 
achieved by common interpretation across countries. However, others 
argue that the domestic law meaning is relevant, especially in common law 
jurisdictions that employ the concept of beneficial owner in domestic law, 
as long as the domestic law meaning is consistent with the Commentaries.
43
The courts in Indofood and Real Madrid adopted an international fiscal 
meaning. In Prévost, on the other hand, Justice Rip adopted a domestic 
solution. However, because the Federal Court of Appeal, in obiter, regarded 
Justice Rip’s approach to be consistent with the OECD position, which 
favours an international fiscal meaning, it is not very clear whether Prévost 
steadfastly stands for a domestic solution. 
41. Prévost (FCA), note 6, Paras. 10 and 11.
42. See, for example, Baker, note 2; De Broe, L., note 2, at 662-675; Du Toit, note 2, 
at 173-177; Fraser and Oliver, note 2; Vogel, note 2, at 561.
43. See, for example, Elliffe, note 2.
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3.2.2.  How to find an international meaning? 
In Indofood, the Chancellor quoted the Commentary, statements from the 
Indonesian tax authorities, and Philip Baker’s writings extensively,
44
 to 
the effect that beneficial owner meant the “full privilege to directly benefit 
from the income”. The Court in Real Madrid also referred to the OECD 
materials and applied the domestic business purpose test in determining 
if the interposed company was the beneficial owner.
45
 As such, although 
OECD materials were referred to, the conclusion in these two cases seemed 
to rest on the domestic law approach: Indonesian law as interpreted by 
the tax authorities in Indofood, and the Spanish business purpose test in 
Real Madrid. The reason for this is likely because the Commentary pro-
vides only a useful “rule of thumb”
46
 on the meaning of beneficial owner 
by concentrating on agents, nominees and conduit companies acting as 
mere fiduciaries or administrators. The Commentary provides no guid-
ance on the factors to be considered in determining, factually and legally, 
whether the powers of the conduit company are akin to those of fiduciaries 
or administrators. 
3.2.3.  Legal or practical determination? 
There are two schools of thoughts on whether beneficial owner should be 
interpreted in a strict legal sense to mean only legal conduits, or more prac-
tically in a business or economic sense to include factual conduits. The 
latter is suggested in the Commentary and the latter tends to be applied in 
countries that do not recognize the substance-over-form doctrine. 
Under a technical legal approach, the term beneficial owner is construed in 
accordance with the legal rights possessed by the conduit entity. It does not 
involve a factual inquiry as to whether, in fact, the conduit has the benefit 
of income. A recipient of income will not be considered a beneficial owner 
if the recipient is a nominee, an agent, or where the legal obligations of 
the recipient to the beneficial owner are such that the recipient is a mere 
44. Indofood, note 3, Para. 37.
45. See note 5, Para. 2. The court stated: “If there is a business reason to place an 
entity between the payer and the final recipient of the income beyond the reduction of 
withholding taxes in Spain, the intermediary will be the beneficial owner; however, if the 
only objective of the interposition of the intermediary is to obtain a reduction of with-
holding tax, there is no business purpose, and consequently, the intermediary is not the 
beneficial owner of the income.”
46. Baker, P. “Beneficial Ownership: After Indofood”, GITC Review, Vol. VI No.1, 
available at www.taxbar.com/documents/Beneficial_Ownership_PB.pdf .
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fiduciary or administrator of the funds and has only very narrow powers 
over the income. It is therefore essential to determine whether the conduit 
owns the income for its own benefit, rather than for the benefit of a third 
party on the basis of private law (such as contracts, corporate law, etc.).
47
 
Prévost and the decision of the High Court in Indofood are examples of this 
technical legal approach. Real Madrid and Bank of Scotland and the Court 
of Appeal decision in Indofood applied the practical, substance-over-form 
approach.
48
The two approaches are best illustrated by the Indofood case. The High 
Court held that the interposed company was the beneficial owner of income. 
It started its analysis by examining the loan agreements and found that: 
The Notes constitute direct, general and unconditional payment obligations of 
the Issuer which will at all times rank pari passu and without any preference 
among themselves and at least pari passu with all other present and future 
obligations of the Issuer, save for such obligations as may be preferred by pro-
visions of law that are both mandatory and of general application.
49
On the basis of the agreements, the High Court concluded that the Issuer 
was the beneficial owner of interest income. It also concluded that the pro-
posed Newco would have the power to dispose of the interest received as it 
wished, although it was constrained by its contractual obligation with the 
Issuer to apply the proceeds of the interest received in performance of those 
obligations. The Court stated: “In no sense will Newco be acting as nomi-
nee or administrator for the Issuer or the Noteholders. It will merely be 
contractually bound to indemnify the Issuer against its obligations to those 
Noteholders. The Noteholders will have no claim to be the beneficial own-
ers of the interest.”
50
 The conclusion that Newco would be the beneficial 
owner was also supported by the fact that Dutch law requires a substance 
and risk test, requiring Newco to make a spread on the interest. 
The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s decision, and held that 
“the meaning to be given to the phrase beneficial owner is plainly not to be 
limited by so technical and legal an approach. Regard is to be had to the 
substance of the matter”.
51
 Reference to the substance of the matter presum-
ably is drawn from Indonesian civil law. The Court of Appeal remarked: 
47. See De Broe, note 2, at 686-689.
48. In Aiken Industries, Inc. v Commissioner, 56 TC 925 (1971).
49. High Court (Chancery Division), 7 October 2005, Indofood International Finance 
Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, London Branch, 8 ITLR 2005, at 236.
50. Id.
51. Indofood, note 3, Para. 44.
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In practical terms it is impossible to conceive of any circumstances in which 
the Issuer or Newco could derive any ‘direct benefit’ from the interest payable 
by [Indofood] except by funding its liability to the Principal Paying Agent 
or Issuer respectively. Such an exception can hardly be described as the ‘full 
privilege’ needed to qualify as the beneficial owner, rather the position of the 
Issuer and Newco equates to that of an ‘administrator of the income’.
52
3.2.4.  Anti-avoidance or basic rule? 
It is currently unclear whether beneficial owner is a legal concept or an 
anti-avoidance rule. In the sense that beneficial owner determines who is 
entitled to treaty benefits it is a basic concept. There was evidence that this 
concept was used in the US–UK tax treaty in the early 1960s to ensure 
that beneficiaries of pension funds did not lose source state treaty benefits 
simply because the pension fund that was the direct owner of the assets was 
not taxable.
53
 The OECD’s recent report on collective investment vehicles, 
directed to the legal and practical issues associated with allowing source 
state treaty benefits for the benefit of investors in mutual funds and the 
like.
54
 On the other hand, there is evidence that this concept and the context 
in which it was introduced into the Model indicate an anti-treaty shopping 
purpose.
55
The cases are inconsistent on this issue. Prévost clearly regards benefi-
cial owner as a legal concept. In this case, although the Canadian courts 
acknowledged the relevance of the Commentaries, they paid little attention 
to the anti-avoidance purpose mentioned in the OECD Commentaries. The 
Federal Court of Appeal clearly rejected any “pejorative view of holding 
companies”.
56
 The courts in Bank of Scotland and Real Madrid seem to 
regard the beneficial ownership provision as a general anti-treaty shopping 
rule. In Bank of Scotland, for example, the Court applied the anti-abuse 
doctrine and found that the arrangement was entered into for the sole pur-
pose of obtaining treaty benefit. Indofood is somewhat ambiguous since 
52. Id., Para. 42.
53. See Oliver, J.D.B., et al., “Beneficial Owner in the OECD Model”, [2001] BTR, 
p. 27.
54. The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs released a Report on “The Granting 
of Treaty Benefits with respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles” on 
23 April 2010. It contains proposed changes to the Commentary on the OECD Model 
dealing with the question of the extent to which either collective investment vehicles 
(CIVs) or their investors are entitled to treaty benefits on income received by the CIVs.
55. Arnold, B.J. “Tax Treaty News”, Bulletin for International Taxation (2009) 175, 
at 176; Baker, note 2; and De Broe, note 2, at 654.
56. Prévost (FCA), note 6, Para. 15.
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the Court of Appeal did not explicitly state that the beneficial owner con-
cept functions as a general anti-treaty shopping rule. Implicitly, however, it 
endorsed the position of the Indonesian tax authorities that treaty shopping 
constitutes an abuse or improper use of tax treaties.
3.2.5.  Relevance of later Commentary? 
There is a high-level of consensus that existing OECD Commentaries are 
relevant in treaty interpretation even though there is a lack of agreement on 
the legal basis
57
 or the proper weight of the Commentaries in the interpreta-
tion of tax treaties.
58
 The fact that very few treaty interpretation cases end 
up in court likely means that the Commentaries help prevent disputes as 
both taxpayers and the tax administration refer to the Commentaries for 
guidance.
59
57. Sasseville, J. “Court Decisions and the Commentary”, in Maisto, G. ed. Courts 
and Tax Treaty Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007), pp. 189-200, summarizes the possible 
legal arguments in support of using the Commentary as a tool for the interpretation of 
tax treaties to include: (a) ordinary meaning under Art. 31.4 of the Vienna Convention; 
(b) special meaning under Art. 31.4 of the Vienna Convention; (c) part of the context 
of the treaty; (d) an instrument related to the treaty under Art. 31(2)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention; (e) supplementary means of interpretation under Art. 32 of Vienna Conven-
tion; (f) international consensus expressed in the OECD Recommendation; (g) OECD 
Recommendation would constitute a legal duty to interpret tax treaties according to the 
Commentary; and (h) doctrines of public international law, such as estoppel, acquies-
cence and reasonable expectations would justify not only looking at the Commentary but 
giving it a mandatory character.
58. There is extensive literature on the relevance of OECD Commentaries to treaty 
interpretation. See, for example, Ault, H.J., “The Role of the OECD Commentaries in 
the Interpretation of Tax Treaties,” in Intertax, 1994, issue 4, p. 144; Lang, M., “Later 
Commentaries of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs not to affect the interpreta-
tion of previously concluded tax treaties,” 25 Intertax 1 (1997), p. 7; Sasseville, note 
55; Vogel, K., “The Influence of the OECD Commentaries on Treaty Interpretation,” 
54 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation p. 12 (2000), p. 614; Ward, D., “Ref-
erences by domestic courts to decisions of foreign courts in interpreting tax treaties,” in 
Maisto, note 57, pp. 161-187; Ward, D., et al., The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties 
with Particular Reference to the Commentaries on the OECD Model (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications B.V., 2005). For an interesting exchange of views on the role of the Com-
mentaries, see Ward, D., “The Role of the Commentaries on the OECD Model in the 
Tax Treaty Interpretation Process” 60 Bulletin for Fiscal Documentation 3 (2006) p. 97; 
Engelen, F., “Some Observations on the Legal Status of the Commentaries on the OECD 
Model,” 60 Bulletin for Fiscal Documentation 3 (2006) p. 205; and Ellis, M., “The Role 
of the Commentaries on the OECD Model in the Tax Treaty Interpretation Process – 
Responses to David Ward,” 60 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 3 (2006) 
p. 103.
59. The emergence of arbitration as a means to resolving tax disputes and the reliance 
on the mutual agreement procedure also increase the relevance of the Commentaries. 
The OECD-endorsed arbitration process requires that “issues of treaty interpretation 
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The relevance of later Commentaries is less clear. At a technical level, it is 
difficult to see how later Commentaries constitute context, a basis for deter-
mining common intention of the negotiators for a special meaning or supple-
mentary means of interpretation within the meaning of Arts. 31 or 32 of the 
Vienna Convention. At a practical level, however, if a taxpayer relies on the 
later Commentary in court, it is unlikely that the court of an OECD country 
would take the position that the taxpayer is not entitled to rely on an interpre-
tation approved by the government of that country.
60
 In terms of the function 
of later Commentaries, a later Commentary may (a) fill a gap in the existing 
Commentary by covering matters not previously mentioned at all, (b) amplify 
the existing Commentary by adding new examples or arguments to what is 
already there, (c) record what states have been doing in practice, or (d) con-
tradict the existing Commentary. Arguably, other than gap filling, later Com-
mentaries deserve some weight in interpreting pre-existing treaties.
61
Indofood, Prévost and Real Madrid confirmed the relevance of later Com-
mentaries. The treaty under interpretation in these cases was concluded 
before the 2003 Commentary. The courts made no distinction between exist-
ing and later Commentaries in Indofood and Real Madrid. In Indofood, the 
Chancellor emphasized that his interpretation of beneficial owner “is entirely con-
sistent with the various [OECD] Commentaries”.
62
 In Prévost, the Federal 
Court of Appeal explicitly stated that the 2003 Commentary was relevant.
3.3.  Unsettling implications 
The international case law on beneficial ownership is inconsistent on the 
basic questions. This is very unfortunate as courts in different countries 
will be decided by the arbitrators in light of the principles of interpretation incorpo-
rated in Arts. 31 to 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, having regard 
to the Commentaries of the OECD Model Tax Convention as periodically amended 
[…]” See Sasseville, note 57, at 197, citing the OECD position available at the website: 
www.oecd.org/document/40/0,2340,en_2649_37427_38057000_1_1_1_37427,00.html.
60. Id. For more discussion, see Sasseville, note 57, at 193. Courts in France (Inter-
home AG decision of 20 June 2003 (RJF 10/03 no. 1147), Canada (Federal Court of 
Appeal in Prévost Car) and other countries have recognized the persuasive value of later 
Commentaries. The Recommendation of the OECD Council (adopted by OECD Council 
on 23 October 1997) recommends the tax administrations of member countries to “fol-
low the commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention, as modified from 
time to time, when applying and interpreting the provisions of their bilateral conventions 
that are based on these Articles.”
61. See, Ward, et al., note 58, at 110.
62. Indofood, note 3, Para. 42.
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are increasingly turning to foreign cases for reference. For example, the 
Supreme Court of India, in dealing with the question that arose under the 
India–Mauritius treaty, referred to a host of foreign court decisions from 
Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom (all English 
language cases).
63
 Decisions in common law countries generally carry 
more weight because of the style of judicial writing and English language 
materials are more easily accessible. Even in civil law countries that do not 
recognize the principle of stare decisis, under which the ratio decidendi of 
a previous case in an appellant court or a higher court is recognized as hav-
ing become part of the law and should be followed in that court and lower 
courts in all subsequent decisions,
64
 courts frequently refer to foreign cases. 
For example, Austrian, French, German, and Dutch courts have referred to 
foreign tax cases in treaty cases.
65
In terms of the impact on future court decisions, Prévost is arguably more 
influential than Indofood. Justice Rip is a highly respected tax expert in 
Canada. His decision was meticulously written, containing a detailed 
statement of facts, references to relevant Canadian, Dutch and OECD 
materials, a summary of the evidence given by four Dutch tax experts, and 
a careful analysis of the meaning of beneficial ownership under Canadian 
law. The decision was unanimously affirmed by a highly respected panel of 
appellate judges known for their tax expertise.
66
63. See Ward, D.A., “Use of Foreign Court Decisions in Interpreting Tax Treaties” in 
Maisto ed., note 57, p. 161; Avery Jones, J. “Tax Treaties: The Perspective of Common 
Law Countries” in Maisto, ed., note 57, p. 31; Martin, Ph., “Courts and Tax Treaties in 
Civil Law Countries,” in Maisto ed., note 57, 81. For example, in Prévost, the Tax Court 
of Canada referred to not only the court decision in the treaty partner state, but also to 
decisions of courts in third states, such as Indofood [Para. 70]. See also Azadi Bacho 
Andolan v. Union of India (2003) 6 ITLR 233.
64. Ward, note 63, at 167. Differences in the style of writing court judgments in civil 
law countries and common law countries are noted by Ward at 172-174 and Avery Jones, 
note 63, at 31-32. For further discussion, see Markesinis, B.S., “A Matter of Style”, 
(1994) 110 LQR p. 607.
65. See “Country Surveys” in Maisto ed., note 57, including: Metzler, V., “Australia” 
p. 215; Perrot, T., “France”, p. 250; Rust, A., “Germany”, pp. 268-269, and Marres, O., 
“Netherlands” p. 326.
66. Prévost (FCA), note 6, Para. 14. The Federal Court of Appeal wrote: The Judge’s 
formulation captures the essence of the concepts of “beneficial owner”, bénéficiaire 
effectif as it emerges from the review of the general, technical and legal meanings of 
the terms. Most importantly, perhaps, the formulation accords with what is stated in the 
OECD Commentaries and in the Conduit Companies Report.
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In contrast, Indofood confirms “one of the great fears of international tax 
lawyers”
67
 that a question concerning beneficial ownership would come 
before a court in a common law country with little or no expertise in inter-
national tax. This case was not strictly a tax case: the judges in Indofood 
were not tax experts, and the case was argued by counsel who had no tax 
expertise. “It is, in many respects, one of the most bizarre features of this 
case that a key issue concerning the meaning of a term used in multiple tax 
treaties was decided without any representation from a revenue authority 
and without the participation of anyone with any expertise in international 
tax before the Court of Appeal”.
68
 Because Indonesia is a civil law jurisdic-
tion that generally does not recognize the concept of beneficial ownership, 
the Court had to look elsewhere to find the meaning for this concept, and 
was thus more inclined to turn to international fiscal meaning. However, “it 
would be difficult to imagine that an UK court’s view of what an Indonesian 
court might conclude in respect of the meaning of ‘beneficial owner’ for 
purposes of the Indonesia–Netherlands treaty is in any way relevant in 
determining the meaning of that term in any other international tax treaty.”
69
What is more unsettling is the fact that both Prévost and Indofood claim 
to be consistent with the OECD position. It is questionable whether the 
statement in Prévost was correct because the Commentary explicitly men-
tions that a conduit company cannot be the beneficial owner if it has, as a 
practical matter, very narrow powers
70
, and Justice Rip’s interpretation of 
beneficial owner did not use a practical approach.
71
 At the same time, it is 
doubtful that the current Commentary supports the statement in Indofood 
that “a technical and legal approach to beneficial ownership should not be 
adopted, but regard should be had to the substance of the matter.”
72
67. Baker, P., “Beneficial Ownership: After Indofood,” first published in GITC 
Review Vol. VI No.1.
68. Id.
69. Chua, C. and Peters, M. “Indofood: a futile search for ‘beneficial owner’” Asia 
Pacific Forum News (December 2008) 4, p. 7.
70. OECD Commentary on Art. 10, Para. 12.1.
71. It is possible that the Federal Court of Appeal, in saying what it did, simply 
wished to indicate that the outcome of the case would not have changed even if these 
OECD materials were used. See Kandev, M.N. and Wiener, B. “Prévost Car Inc. (FCA): 
Holdco Confirmed as Beneficial Owner of Dividends”, CCH, Tax Topics, March 12, 
2009, No.1931.
72. Commentators in common law countries have generally expressed concerns about 
the economic substance-over-form approach to the interpretation of “beneficial owner-
ship”. See, for example, Arnold, note 52, at 176 (the Indonesian court’s endorsement of 
the “substance-over-form” doctrine in PT Transportasi Gas Indonesia was “most dis-
turbing”); Baker, note 67, considered the statement in Indofood to be “less helpful” on 
the ground that “broad brush, substance approach was bound to lead to uncertainty”.
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Overall, the general significance of these cases, especially Indofood and 
Prévost, is questionable. The circumstances of those cases very much 
affected how the courts approached them. As such, they may not be very 
useful for establishing overriding principles. For example, in Prévost, while 
the Court took a highly technical legal approach, the result was a practical 
accommodation to reality. This was evidenced by the fact that the Court 
decided to ignore sloppiness in the declaration and payment of dividends, 
seeing the case in effect, as a domestic shareholder loan case.  Also, there 
was evidence in Prévost that the Canadian authorities were indifferent as to 
the result because it secured a treaty rate that was consistent with Canada’s 
general treaty rate for direct dividends, a rate that at the time was intended 
that both the Swedish and UK treaties would have. Indofood was really 
just a commercial case, in which the tax principles were not well argued. 
There was also some doubt whether the original Indonesia–Maruitius plan-
ning structure actually worked. In effect, the Court in Indofood seemed to 
conclude that the mere interposition of a legal construction in a relationship 
and flow of interest income that existed and continued to exist as if the 
intermediary did not exist, would not be effective to change consequences.
73
4.  Case for clarity through revising the  
OECD Commentary
This section makes the case for more clarity through changes to the Com-
mentary on the ground that international case law is confusing, causing 
uncertainty for taxpayers, and that revising the Commentary is the most 
practical solution.
4.1.  To clarify judicial interpretation
There is precedence for the OECD introducing uniform approaches to 
treaty interpretation after an adverse court decision. Examples are the 2005 
amendments to the Commentary on Art. 5 in reaction to the Italian Philip 
Morris case
74
 and the changes to the Commentary on Art. 3, and Art. 3 itself, 
73. The author credits some of the ideas to comments made by Scott Wilkie on the 
draft of this paper.
74. Sasseville, note 57, at 197-198. Decisions of the Tax Chamber of the Supreme 
Court of Italy: Nos. 3367 and 3368 of 20 December 2001 (released on 7 March 2002), 
No.7682 of 20 December 2001 (released on 25 May 2002), No.10925 of 20 December 
2001 (released on 25 July 2002).
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in reaction to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Melford.75 There 
is a case for similar OECD reaction to clarify the meaning of beneficial 
owner. 
4.2.  To provide more certainty
Taxpayers face significant uncertainty with respect to the approach to inter-
preting beneficial owner. The degree of such uncertainty was evidenced by 
the panic reaction of the international tax community to the Indofood deci-
sion. In order to provide clarity, HMRC in the United Kingdom, while accept-
ing Indofood as part of UK tax law, issued guidance to contain its impact, 
especially in the case of special purpose vehicles.
76
 The tax administration in 
other countries may not be prepared to limit Indofood in the same manner.
The potential impact of Prévost is uncertain. The Canada Revenue Agency is 
likely to litigate more treaty shopping cases.
77
 The Federal Court of Appeal’s 
endorsement of later Commentary in Prévost may give the government new 
ammunition to try its argument in another case. In Prévost, the government 
argued, without success, that the interpretation of beneficial owner requires 
a search behind the legal relationships in order to identify the person who, as 
a matter of fact, can ultimately benefit from the income. The argument was 
made on the ground that the French word effectif means real or producing 
actual effects or resulting in real action, and the term bénéficiaire effectif 
means the person or group that actually and truly enjoys or benefits from 
an advantage of any kind. Justice Rip was not persuaded in Prévost, but 
another judge may be if the facts can be distinguished somewhat from this 
case. After all, the Federal Court of Appeal accepted the OECD position that 
favours an international fiscal meaning and a practical approach.
4.3.  To provide a practical solution 
The meaning of beneficial owner can be clarified through changes to 
the hard law or soft law. The former can be accomplished through the 
75. The Queen v. Melford Developments Inc. (182), 139 DLR (3d) 577. For more 
discussion, see Sasseville, note 57, at 198.
76. UK HMRC, “HM Revenue & Customs reaction to Indofood case”, DT Claims 
and applications – Beneficial Ownership, INTM332050.
77. There is at least one case, Velcro v. Canada, 2007-1806 (IT)G. that is currently 
pending before the Tax Court. This case involves issues of beneficial ownership in a 
treaty context.
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introduction of either a definition of beneficial owner or a specific anti-
conduit company provision
78
 or general limitation-on-benefit clause.
79
The bilateral nature of tax treaties means that changes to the hard law must 
be made to each treaty. Such treaty-by-treaty solution is highly unrealistic 
as it takes time to renegotiate tax treaties. Differences among treaties will 
continue to create opportunities for treaty shopping. The lack of a com-
mon meaning of beneficial owner inevitably means that uncertainty will 
continue.
80
Alternatively, clarity may be provided through changes to soft law – the 
OECD Commentaries. The OECD has been recognized as a de facto inter-
national tax organization. The Model has been widely adopted by mem-
ber states as well as non-member states.
81
 National tax administrations and 
taxpayers look to the OECD for leadership in formulating policy dealing 
with emerging issues, such as e-commerce, international tax competition, 
and cross-border tax dispute resolution, most of which was accomplished 
through revision to the Commentary. In the absence of a multilateral tax 
treaty or international tax organization, the OECD is expected to continue to 
shape international tax policy. 
The soft law approach is more practical because later Commentaries are 
likely considered by domestic courts in interpreting beneficial owner in 
future cases. Practically speaking, the OECD is in the best position to clar-
ify if Indofood or Prévost is consistent with the Commentaries.
78. A specific rule may look like the following: “The provisions of this article shall 
not apply if it was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of any person con-
cerned with the creation or assignment of the debt-claim in respect of which the interest 
is paid to take advantage of the Article by means of that creation or assignment.” See 
Fraser, R. and J.D.B. Oliver, “Beneficial Ownership: HMRC’s Draft Guidance on Inter-
pretation of the Indofood decision”, [2007] BTR p. 39 at 42.
79. A general limitation-on-benefit provision similar to a provision included in Art. 
22 of the 2006 US Model has been included in some US treaties.
80. Avery Jones, J., “The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: “Are tax treaties necessary?” 
[1999] 53 Tax Law Rev.1, pp. 3-8.
81. See Cockfield, A.J. “The Rise of the OECD as Informal ‘World Tax Organization’ 
through National Responses to Ecommerce Tax Challenges,” 9 Yale J. L. & Tech. (2006) 
p. 59; Ring, D., “Who is Making International Tax Policy?: International Organizations 
as Power Players in a High Stakes World,” 33 Fordham Int’l L.J. (forthcoming 2010). 
See also Tillinghast, D.R., “Commentaries to the OECD Model Convention: Ubiquitous, 
Often Controversial; But Could They Possibly Be Legally Binding?”, 35 Tax Mgmt. Int’l 
580 2006); and Avi-Yonah, R.S., “International Tax as International Law,” 57 Tax L. Rev. 
(2004) p. 483.
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Ultimately, however, certainty is a relative notion. While the foundation 
of international tax law is shaky or incoherent,
82
 it is too much to ask for 
absolute certainty for the meaning of a concept that is supposedly intended 
to define the confines of the treaty bargain. The OECD Commentary can 
at least clarify the basic questions raised in this paper and provide some 
consistency for the interpretation of a unique treaty concept.
82. See, Kingson, C.I., “The Coherence of International Taxation”, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 
1151 (1981).
